In Loc Ninh Campaign, despite facing US and Saigon regime units, the armed forces of the (South) Eastern Regional Command displayed remarkable flexibility in shaping and shifting the battlefield. Time and again our armed forces launched attacks with deadly effect, forcing the enemy onto the defensive, leaving them bewildered and struggling to respond. This created the condition needed for our armed forces and people to prepare for 1968 Spring General Offensive and Uprising.

By the end of 1967, our sustained pressure across the Southern battlefield, combined with their crushing defeat in Operation Junction City, compelled the US and their Saigon allies to call off their second strategic counter-offensive in bitterness and frustration. Their position and strength were severely weakened.

The people of Loc Ninh welcome our Liberation Army units, 7 April 1972 (file photo)

To salvage the situation, the US raised its troop levels in South Vietnam to 400,000 and poured in more modern weapons, equipment, and vehicles. Their ambition was to launch a third strategic counter-offensive into Duong Minh Chau Base Area during the dry season of 1967 - 1968, stepping up their “pacification” and “search and destroy” campaigns against our main forces in the (South) Eastern Region, while carving out a buffer zone to shield Saigon from afar. To that end, in the strategic belt of Loc Ninh - Bu Dop - Route 13, the enemy deployed additional troops and military equipment, establishing numerous outposts, creating multiple military sub-sectors. Among these, Loc Ninh was turned into a key strongpoint in their defensive line along Route 13, a so-called “steel shield” protecting the northern approaches to Saigon.

As for our side, seizing the opportunity while the US and their Saigon allies were strategically on the defensive, our Politburo and Central Military Commission decided to concentrate forces and resources to launch a series of Autumn - Winter operations. The aim was to deliver follow-up blows, disrupt the enemy’s preparations for a counter-offensive, and push them ever deeper into passive stance. To put this plan into practice, the Regional Command decided to open Loc Ninh Campaign, with the aim of destroying a critical part of the enemy’s manpower and war materiel, drawing in and tying down the US’s 1^st Infantry Division and Saigon puppet regime’s 5^th Infantry Division in mountainous and jungle areas, thereby creating favourable battlefield conditions around major cities for our forces to launch attacks, supporting our people’s political struggle, expanding base areas, preparing for a General Offensive and Uprising in the spring of 1968.

That was a campaign in which we concentrated large forces and carried out combined-arms operations. In spite of the fact that the area of operations lay far from our logistical bases, under the spirit of “daring to fight, knowing how to fight, and determining to defeat US invaders”, by applying our unique military art, our armed forces and people inflicted heavy losses on the enemy’s elite forces and destroyed large quantities of US - Saigon weaponry. Victory of the Campaign marked a significant development of Regional main units in the conduct of operational-level military actions, in which the art of creating and transforming the battlefield was particularly outstanding.

First, clever diversions and the establishment of a sharp, deadly initial disposition. To force the enemy to stretch thin in other directions and then deal sudden, decisive blows on the main axis, the Campaign Command decided to intensify diversionary operations, creating deception and entrapment, step by step causing confusion among the enemy and forcing them to react in a passive manner. Accordingly, on the secondary axis of attack, the Command ordered Regiment 271 to set up an ambush in Ong Thanh area, resulting in the destruction of 2^nd Battalion (2^nd Brigade, US forces), employing Regiment 88 to assault Phuoc Qua 3 outpost, destroying 3^rd Battalion (US forces), directing artillery units to bombard Phuoc Long sub-sector, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. These diversionary blows at the outset of the Campaign on the secondary axis led the enemy to misjudge our main direction of attack. They immediately rushed two elite battalions and supporting artillery to Phuoc Long, thus exposing significant vulnerabilities along Loc Ninh axis - our principal direction of attack.

Exploiting the favourable outcomes of those diversionary manoeuvres, the Campaign Command ordered forces on the secondary and supporting axes to continue interlocking deployments, launching widespread strikes across the battlefield in order to facilitate the concentration of forces on the main axis. Regiment 88 and Battalion 2 (Division 5) were positioned to the east and northeast of Phuoc Long sub-sector. On the principal axis (Loc Ninh), the Command deployed Regiment 141 and Regiment 165 (Division 7) to the southwest, Regiment 2 and Regiment 3 (Division 9) to the northeast, and Binh Long provincial local forces to encircle targets in the northwest. Regiment 1 (Division 9) was held in reserve, deployed northeast of Phuoc Long, ready to coordinate with Phuoc Long provincial forces to engage mobile enemy reinforcements attempting relief operations. With these “steel fists” concentrated on the main axis, and through interlocking contingents deployed closely to enemy formations, we created a “pouncing tiger” posture - maximising the effectiveness of direct firepower while skilfully applying the principle of “gripping the enemy’s belt to fight”, thus limiting the destructive power of enemy artillery and air power, repeatedly inflicting crushing blows on US - Saigon troops.

The developments of the Campaign demonstrated that, thanks to skilful diversion and the establishment of a sharp and deadly initial disposition, when our forces launched assaults on Loc Ninh sub-sector, the enemy was taken completely by surprise, thrown into confusion, and we seized the initiative from the outset. Meanwhile, the enemy, though initially strong, weakened step by step, their numbers diminished, and they sank ever deeper into passivity - making one mistake after another - until their eventual defeat.

Second, opportunely transforming the battlefield and shifting the direction of attack at the right moment. In order to counter the enemy’s tactics of “armoured thrusts” and “airmobile assaults”, while limiting their superiority in firepower and mobility, the Campaign Command closely followed developments on the battlefield, promptly adjusting its objectives, altering its tactical methods. As a result, the enemy was repeatedly caught off guard, deprived of the initiative, and suffered defeat after defeat. In Phase 1 of the Campaign, after coordinating units to attack Loc Ninh military sub-sector and police station, the Campaign Command detected an enemy airborne landing in Mang Cai area. Immediately, it ordered Battalion 3, Regiment 3 (Division 9) to redeploy and shift the disposition from attacking enemy in fortifications to assault and closely coordinate with Regiment 165 to annihilate one US battalion, one US artillery company, and one US ranger company.

Similarly, on Phuoc Long axis, Regiment 88 set up an ambush along Phuoc Binh - Phuoc Qua road, wiping out an enemy relief force consisting of companies of the 3^rd Battalion. Refusing to accept defeat, the enemy then deployed the 36^th Ranger Battalion from Tu Hien junction to reinforce Phuoc Qua. Seizing this opportunity, our Regiment 88 redeployed its forces, assigning additional tasks to its subordinate units, shifting from ambush to attack on the move, coordinating with Battalion 2 (Division 5) to quickly seize advantageous terrain to encircle the enemy, driving them into a “last stand” position where they were quickly destroyed.

Entering Phase 2, in order to create the element of surprise, the Campaign Command decided to shift the principal direction of attack from Loc Ninh to Bu Dop area. This was a bold decision, but it reflected the Command’s keen strategic sense, accurate assessment of the situation, and flexible adaptation to battlefield realities. Consequently, while the enemy was still in confusion, making passive attempts to recapture lost positions at Loc Ninh, they were suddenly subjected to our relentless assaults at Bu Dop. With this unexpected shift of the main axis and the firm grasp of initiative, our Regiment 141 ambushed and destroyed a US grouping at Tan Khai, annihilating and heavily damaging two US companies and one puppet ranger company attempting to reinforce their positions along Route 13 (south of Hon Quan); our Regiment 88 attacked Phuoc Hua outpost; our Regiments 2 and 3 attacked and destroyed the enemy in Bu Dop sub-sector, and so on. Although the US and their Saigon allies deployed elite units with maximum air and artillery support, continuously rushing in reinforcements in hopes of retaking lost positions, the timely adjustment of our fighting methods and the decision to shift the main direction of attack at the opportune moment enabled our Region’s regular units to annihilate enemy battalions one by one, thereby accomplishing the objectives of the Campaign.

Third, flexible, creative application of tactical forms and fighting methods. With the guiding principle of “flexibly, effectively applying tactical forms, concentrating forces to conduct major engagements aiming at the complete destruction of enemy units, focusing primarily on engaging the enemy outside their fortifications, prioritising attacking the enemy inside their bases when the opportunity arises, especially positions of military and political significance, and preparing appropriate plans and forces to defeat enemy relief forces and counter-attacks”, the Campaign Command directed its subordinate units to flexibly and creatively employ tactical forms and fighting methods to promptly defeat any enemy combat plan. Accordingly, to “lure” the enemy out of their bases and force them to deploy their forces and hardware in the open as the favourable condition for us to eliminate their well-armed battalions, our forces skilfully used diversionary manoeuvres and carefully selected suitable targets to provoke their response. At the same time, our forces effectively employed the tactic of attacking enemy in fortifications, maintaining sustained pressure on “key targets”, such as Loc Ninh and Bu Dop sub-sectors and Phuoc Qua 3 outpost. This compelled the enemy to commit strong mobile forces for relief operations, only to be destroyed in the trap that we had deliberately prepared in advance.

When engaging the enemy outside fortifications, the situation developed rapidly and unpredictably, requiring the Campaign Command to apply flexible, innovative tactical forms and fighting methods to defeat enemy operational schemes. Our units were ordered to conduct raids ranging in size from company to under-strength division levels so as to maintain the initiative, and to strike when the enemy foothold was “not yet firmly established” - whether it was newly landed US battalions (as in the raid on Hill 224), or forces that had already established defensive positions (as in the raids on Loc Ninh airstrip and Bu Dop and Mang Cai). Raids were carried out not only against infantry but also against mechanised forces temporarily on standby (as at Tan Khai). At the same time, the Campaign Command skilfully chose terrain of tactical value to set up highly effective ambushes. Examples included Regiment 88 (Division 5) ambushing and destroying an enemy mechanised column on Phuoc Binh – Phuoc Qua road, and ambushes against enemy relief forces at Tay Mang Cai, north of Ranger Camp, and Bu Dop sub-sector. Moreover, in each battle, combat methods, such as encirclement, breakthrough, deep penetration, cutting-off actions, and concentrated artillery strikes were flexibly employed by our units. As a result, the more we fought, the stronger we grew; the more the enemy fought, the weaker they became. Our forces always fought with “firm grips on the enemy’s belt”, creating interlocking battle arrays that prevented the enemy from identifying lines of contact or effectively using their firepower against us. In this way, our strengths were maximised to create combined combat power, defeating any enemy’s fighting plan.

The war has long since passed, but the lessons on creating and transforming the battlefield - and on seizing the initiative in combat - drawn from the Loc Ninh Campaign retain their values and should continue to be further studied, applied, and creatively developed in any (potential) war for Fatherland protection.

HO TRUNG HIEU, PhD

Infantry Officer College No.2