Reality has proved the vital role of ideological work, particularly at grass-roots level, in fostering individual development, building strong organisations, and ensuring uniformity in terms of will and action across a unit. In light of new developments in the current situation and tasks, it is necessary to thoroughly study and grasp the emerging issues. At the same time, appropriate solutions must be adopted to enhance the effectiveness of ideological work as a matter of both critical importance and urgency.

President Ho Chi Minh once affirmed: “Ideological leadership is the most important thing... from superior to inferior, from inside to outside, when there is uniformity in thought and action, no matter how heavy the responsibilities or how difficult and complex the tasks may be, we will certainly achieve victory”.

Military Region 4’s Command gives rewards to new soldiers of Regiment 3, Division 324 for their excellent shooting results

Fully aware of the importance of ideological work, over the years, party committees and commands at grass-roots units within the Military have exercised their close leadership and direction over this work. Ideological work has been carried out in a comprehensive, continuous manner, with rich content, diverse forms, and flexible methods, thereby shaping and developing worldview, motivations for self-improvement, and standard behaviours among officers and soldiers. Cadres at grass-roots level have consistently kept a close grasp of the situation, proactively monitoring ideological developments, guiding public opinion in a timely way, resolving emerging concerns. These efforts have contributed to fostering officers and soldiers’ political will, revolutionary ethics, determination, and unwavering commitment to serve the Fatherland and the people.

However, amid the country’s wide and deep integration into the world and the robust development of digital technology and social networks, ideological work at grass-roots level is now facing new challenges. Evil information, individualism, materialistic lifestyle, and tactics of “peaceful evolution” are becoming increasingly sophisticated and pervasive in the living space of military personnel. These are non-traditional threats that can cause value-related conflicts, erode trust, and diminish the will to strive, particularly among those who lack political experience or have low resilience to external influences. In fact, there have been signs of ideological wavering, declining confidence, and even disciplinary violations stemming from political - ideological misconception, moral degradation, and weakened sense of duty. If ideological work is treated lightly or carried out superficially, together with a lack of systematic approaches, the effectiveness of this work in a unit will inevitably be low; that unit will lose its “spiritual foundation”, and its combat strength will be undermined.

In today’s ever-changing military and social environment, ideological work is not only a regular task, but also a scientific and action-oriented system, with a close combination between theory and practice as well as between military psychology, political sociology, and modern military communications. So, how can ideological work at grass-roots level be truly effective? How can it guide troop thinking, strengthen resolve, shape belief, and inspire revolutionary action among military personnel? To answer these fundamental questions, it is necessary to research and effectively implement several following measures.

Firstly, it is important to eliminate the barrier of “bureaucratisation” in conducting ideological work. In practice, ideological work at some grass-roots units has signs of bureaucratisation, superficiality, and formalism, lacking two-way interactions, which result in limited effectiveness in certain times and places. The content of ideological education and orientation during political activities sometimes leans heavily toward one-way propaganda and imposition, with little emphasis on analysis and explanation to help military personnel understand and voluntarily internalise the message. Some topics are highly theoretical but fail to be relatable or appropriate to the cognitive level of target individuals. In some cases, ideological work is not closely aligned with troops’ actual needs, relying mainly on pre-set plans.

To address this drawback, leaders and commanders of grass-roots units must shift from a “management” mindset to an “accompaniment” mindset; they must consider ideological work not as the imposition of content, but as a process of interaction and sharing that could enable troops to understand, believe, and act. Ideological work must evolve from a mere educational or propaganda activity into a continuous process of accompaniment and interaction between commanders and each service member. In this process, troops should be placed at the centre, with real-life needs as the foundation, and cognitive - behavioural outcomes as the measure of effectiveness. Ideological work should be organised as an “accompaniment - guidance - adjustment” process; party committees and party cells serve as the leadership core; political commissars and commanders are the primary organisers; all officers must participate in ideological education, orientation, and correction for their subordinates.

Secondly, it is essential to eliminate “old paths and familiar routines” in conducting ideological work. A common issue observed in some units is that ideological work continues to operate according to traditional models characterised by content-heavy, top-down imposition, limited dialogue, minimal critical engagement, and little stimulation of independent thinking. This inadvertently places officers and soldiers in a state of passive reception - a passive psychological condition that lacks emotional connection and fails to build a sustainable ideological foundation. Meanwhile, the psychology and information-receiving habits of troops, especially the young ones are increasingly shaped by the digital environment. However, methods of ideological education in some units remain lecture-based and uni-directional, creating a worrying mismatch between “outdated delivery methods” and “modern mindset of recipients”. This mismatch reduces the outcome of ideological work and delays its political - spiritual effectiveness. At the root of this issue is the slow innovation among those who are responsible for ideological work; many of them still follow entrenched habits, being hesitant to change, lacking confidence in adopting new methods. Besides, the effectiveness of ideological activities is often evaluated based on the quantity of activities rather than the quality of cognitive and behavioural transformation among troops, which must be the core criterion of modern ideological work.

Social - psychological science has shown that sustainable behaviour must originate from an internalised cognitive process and pass through the stages of emotion - reasoning - agreement - action. If methods fail to stimulate emotions, provoke thought, or generate cognitive trust, even the most correct ideological orientations will be hardly transformed into positive political behaviour. Therefore, innovating methods of ideological work at grass-roots level is an urgent requirement for building political resilience among military personnel. Each ideological activity must be a proactive, creative psychological - educational process - integrated with digital technology and interdisciplinary approaches. There must be a gradual shift from “propaganda - dissemination” to “impact - transformation”, and from imposed education to an approach that emphasises suggestion, dialogue, and interaction. Innovating methodology means expanding cognitive space for officers and soldiers, generating internal motivation for political - spiritual development. It is also the key to making ideological work a true driving force for the building of a politically strong Military.

Thirdly, it is necessary to address avoidance and fear of responsibility in handling ideological issues. Nowadays, one of the most concerning trends in ideological work at grass-roots level is that some officers show reluctance to confront or take responsibility for addressing ideological deviations among troops. In some cases, even when officers detect abnormal ideological signals, they refrain from giving feedback, initiating dialogue, or taking action because of the fear of disrupting internal relations, “making big trouble”, or being held accountable. The core contradiction lies in the fact that units can identify risks but lack the motivation and mechanisms for early intervention. This runs counter to the nature of ideological work, which demands proactive identification, engagement, and transformation. Some party committees and commands exhibit collective defensive psychology, choosing to avoid, delay, or reassure themselves with silence rather than confront the problem. As a result, early signs of ideological deviation go unaddressed, lingering and potentially becoming sources of instability within the unit.

Hence, it is essential to build a democratic, disciplined, reliable ideological environment within units; subordinates are encouraged to speak frankly, while superiors are willing to listen, engage in dialogue, and act decisively. At all levels, there must be mechanisms to protect whistle-blowers, support those tasked with addressing issues, and objectively evaluate the outcomes. Moreover, the process of “early detection - flexible handling - timely conclusion” must be institutionalised as a mandatory component of ideological work in every unit. Ideological issues cannot be settled through compromise - and certainly not through silence.

Fourthly, it is vital to make a decisive breakthrough in clearing “bottlenecks” and proactively grasp, forecast, and effectively handle emerging ideological situations. In reality, there have been numerous instances where ideological issues had simmered without being realised for some time. Only when these issues manifested in specific behaviours or attitudes were interventions carried out, thereby resulting in passivity, confusion, and even serious consequences. This is particularly likely during highly sensitive periods, such as leave, demobilisation, reassignment, command changes, field training, and contingency tasks. The root cause is not merely “lack of attention”, but more deeply, a lack of tools and mechanisms, particularly a lack of psychological - political diagnostic skills among some officers. Several units have not consistently maintained standard practices, such as regular ideological briefings, ideological diaries, or in-depth interviews, thus missing early warning signs of deviation.  In fact, forecasting ideological tendencies requires keen observation, information processing, and empathetic psychological engagement with troops. Therefore, it cannot be effective if ideological grasp remains at the level of administrative report or superficial communication.

To address that problem, units must rigorously implement a full ideological work process, integrating both direct and indirect monitoring, traditional face-to-face interaction and the application of information technology. There should be a progressive development of modern ideological survey models, such as “ideological feedback email box”, “internal online forum”, or “anonymous response system”. At the same time, it is essential to improve socio-psychological analysis skills of officers at all levels. More importantly, the process of grasping - analysing - forecasting - responding to ideological trends must be institutionalised as a closed-loop, continuous cycle - guided by the principle of proactivity and triggered by even the smallest signals.

Ideological work at grass-roots level across the Military always evolves and presents new challenges that must be thoroughly understood and addressed to achieve genuine effectiveness. This article presents only a limited perspective, aimed at providing useful reference for units in their efforts to enhance the effectiveness of this important task in the new situation.

Lt. Col. PHAM VAN HAU, PhD

Political Officer College