In the past 80 years of construction, combat, victory, and maturity, under the leadership and direction of the Party Central Committee (PCC) and President Ho Chi Minh, particularly the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the Ministry of National Defence (MND), the General Staff has always excellently fulfilled its role as a strategic, confidential, key staff organ of the Vietnam People’s Army (VPA), making a worthy contribution to the cause of national liberation, construction, and protection.

Right after the foundation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with his strategic thinking and vision, on 7 September 1945, President Ho Chi Minh directed the establishment of the General Staff (GS). He instructed: “As a confidential military body of the Organisation and a key organ of the Military, the GS is tasked with organising and training the Military properly, grasping the situation of the enemy and ourselves, designing clever strategies, and ensuring a smooth, secret, rapid, timely, accurate command system to defeat any enemies and protect the revolution”. Following his instructions, the GS quickly consolidated its structure, supplemented forces, and proactively performed urgent, crucial tasks to meet the revolution’s urgent requirements.

Gen. Phan Van Giang, Minister of National Defence congratulates the GS on the success of its 19th Party Congress for 2025 - 2030 tenure

Amid numerous difficulties of the resistance war against the French, under the motto of “building and combating simultaneously” and “growing via combat realities”, the GS developed itself from “nothing” into a “strong, capable” agency, proactively studying and grasping situational developments, opportunely assisting the CMC and MND in giving advice to the PCC and President Ho Chi Minh on organising and building strong armed forces in terms of quantity, scale, equipment, and combat capability to meet the requirements of the resistance war. At the same time, it directly commanded the armed forces to closely collaborate with the people to continuously achieve major victories on the battlefield, maintain the strategic initiative, and make the enemy fall into passivity. During the 1953 - 1954 Winter Spring Offensive, it made correct situational assessments, opportunely designing strategic combat plans under the Politburo’s guidelines and the CMC’s direction, commanding the launch of offensives in strategic directions, dispersing and isolating the enemy’s main mobile units as a favourable condition for our VPA and people to win victory in the decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu that “resounded across the five continents, shook the globe”, forced the French to sign Geneva Accords on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, and ended our resistance war against French colonialists.

In the resistance war against the US for national salvation, the GS showcased its knowledge and ingenuity, helping the CMC and MND give advice to the PCC and Politburo on formulating strategic operational guidelines and methods relevant to combat realities, building increasingly strong three-category armed forces, commanding the armed forces to collaborate with the people to defeat strategies of the US and Saigon puppet regime, achieving strategic victories in the 1968 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, Route 9 - Southern Laos Campaign of 1971, and Hanoi - Hai Phong Air Defence Campaign in late 1972, forcing the US to sign Paris Peace Accords (January 1973) on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam. Notably, in 1974 and early 1975, with its sharp, acute thinking, the GS correctly evaluated the strategic opportunity, recommending the CMC and MND to give advice to the PCC and Politburo on opportunely devising strategic combat resolution and plans and directing the entire VPA to work with local people to successfully conduct the 1975 Spring General Offensive and Uprising, with Ho Chi Minh Campaign as its culmination, thereby completely liberating the South and unifying the country.

In the war for Southwestern border protection and the fight for Northern border protection, the GS continued giving advice to the CMC and MND on leading and directing our VPA and people to promote the strength of people’s war, achieve new feats of arms, firmly defend national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and help the people of Cambodia escape from the Khmer Rouge genocidal regime.  

In the period of Doi Moi (renovation), the GS has well performed the work of strategic research and forecast, assisting the CMC and MND in giving advice to the Party and State on formulating military - defence guidelines in the new situation, adjusting strategic disposition and Determination to Protect the Socialist Vietnamese Fatherland, building all-people national defence associated with people’s security, making postures of all-people national defence and people’s security increasingly strong, and developing a revolutionary, regular, elite VPA towards modernity, thus greatly contributing to the cause of Fatherland construction and protection.

Sr. Lt. Gen. Phung Si Tan, Deputy Chief of the GS inspects preparatory work for the 2nd Vietnam - Laos border defence friendship exchange

Over the past 80 years, in any circumstances, the GS has always been absolutely loyal to the Fatherland, Party, State, and people, undertaking any missions, significantly contributing to the cause of national liberation, construction, and protection, bolstering the glorious tradition of the heroic VPA, worthy of a strategic, confidential, key staff organ of the Military.

In the upcoming years, the situation on global and regional scales continue to have rapid, complex developments; peace and cooperation will still prevail; however, strategic competition between major powers, non-traditional security challenges, and armed conflicts will be still complicated. Disputes over territories, seas, and islands, including those in the East Sea continue to have complex developments. Domestically, political security, social order, and economic growth have been maintained; defence and security have been strengthened; diplomatic work has gained impressive achievements. Nevertheless, in some places, rural and urban security still faces destabilising factors; hostile forces continue stepping up their “peaceful evolution” strategy, promoting “self-evolution” and “self-transformation”, and taking advantage of issues on democracy and human rights to sabotage our Party, State, and VPA. That context imposes very high requirements on the Military in general, the GS in particular in the cause of VPA building, national defence consolidation, and Fatherland protection.

Bringing into play the 80-year heroic tradition of a strategic staff organ, the GS will continue proactively, effectively performing its tasks and focus on well implementing several main measures as follows.

First, continuing to build a politically strong GS. Synergy of the GS in the past 80 years has been a crystallisation of various factors; in this regard, political steadfastness and willpower have always been a solid foundation for cadres, employees, and soldiers of the GS to overcome all difficulties, hardships, and sacrifice and successfully fulfil the responsibilities of a strategic staff organ. Flexibly, creatively applying that lesson, the GS Party Committee will lead and direct party committees and commands of offices and units to carry out political and ideological education work aimed at heightening troops’ political steadfastness and absolute loyalty to the Fatherland, Party, and people, rendering cadres, employees, and soldiers fully aware of Fatherland protection tasks, the role of special importance of the GS, and difficulties, challenges, and requirements in their missions, stimulating patriotism and national pride among all cadres and soldiers, and encouraging troops to successfully accomplish all assigned tasks.

The GS will continue studying and following Ho Chi Minh’s ideology, ethics, and lifestyle in line with the CMC’s Resolution 847-NQ/QUTW, dated 28 December 2021, on promoting the virtues of “Uncle Ho’s Soldiers” and resolutely fighting individualism in the new situation. To that end, emphasis should be placed on building strong, pure party committees and party organisations at all levels with great leadership capacity and combativeness, renewing their leadership style and methods, raising their capacity to develop and realise resolutions. Due attention should be paid to maintaining regulations on party meetings, raising the quality of party meetings, and ensuring democratic centralism, collective leadership, and individual accountability in all steps and stages of leadership.

Offices and units should be fully aware of the confidentiality and pivotal role of a strategic staff organ in the new situation and continue well performing internal political protection work, ensuring security and safety, and keeping secrets of the State and VPA. They should proactively prevent and neutralise hostile forces’ tactics of infiltration, collusion, and sabotage to ensure the absolute safety in terms of politics. Besides, they should enhance the work of inspection, supervision, and Party discipline, build strong mass organisations and soldiers’ councils, and effectively sustain the Determined to Win Emulation Movement.

Second, focusing on building a pool of strategic staff cadres on par with their tasks. When he was alive, President Ho Chi Minh believed that “cadres are the root of all work”. As for the GS, the building of a corps of strategic staff cadres plays a role of paramount importance. Thus, offices and units across the GS should continue grasping and effectively executing the CMC’s Resolution 109-NQ/QUTW, dated 11 February 2019, on “building a pool of military cadres, particularly at strategic and operational levels to meet the task requirements in the new situation” and the GS Party Committee’s Resolution 245 - NQ/ĐU, dated 3 July 2019, on building a contingent of cadres to meet the task requirements in the new situation. Based on those documents, they should collaborate with competent agencies to closely screen and carefully recruit cadres with good political qualities, pure revolutionary ethics, and experiences in command and management to the GS so as to meet the demanding requirements of a strategic, confidential, key body of the VPA.

Furthermore, it is necessary to step up the training and development of cadres in a modernised, standardised, synchronised, specialised manner according to their job titles. Emphasis should be placed on developing a contingent of strategic staff cadres who have sufficient “virtues, vision, and knowledge”, stay absolutely loyal to the Fatherland, Party, State, and people, remain steadfastness in the goal of national independence and socialism, “put the interests of the nation, Party, State, and people above all else”, and readily fight and sacrifice for the Fatherland’s independence and freedom. At the same time, all-level cadres should demonstrate a strong sense of discipline, set good examples in words and action, dare to think, dare to do, dare to take responsibility, uphold dedication and innovation, and possess comprehensive, outstanding capabilities, sharp thinking, strategic vision, and great command and staff competence at strategic and operational levels. Amid rapid, complex situational changes around the world and in the region and the high requirements of Fatherland protection, it is vital to build a pool of GS cadres with strategic thinking and acumen in assessing and processing information, correctly, quickly forecasting complex, sensitive issues, and giving sound, timely advice on formulating strategic solutions and plans to successfully deal with all possible situations.

Offices and units across the GS should conduct the work of personnel evaluation and planning in a close, substantive, uniform manner, actively detect and appoint cadres with great qualities, capabilities, and potential to key positions, and prepare human resources at strategic and operational levels with increasing quality and proper quantity.

Third, building an “exemplary, typical” GS in terms of regularity building, discipline management, and combat readiness to deserve to be the highest command body of the VPA and the Militia and Self-Defence Force, setting a good example for the entire Military to study and follow. To that end, the GS Party Committee will continue leading and directing party committees and commands of offices and units to grasp and effectively implement documents and guidance by the MND on regularity building and discipline management, with a view to making a positive change in awareness and action among cadres, employees, and soldiers. Therefore, leaderships and commands of offices and units should grasp and well perform their functions and tasks, abide by the State’s law, military discipline, internal statutes, and regulations on example-setting responsibility of cadres and party members, and set good examples for their subordinates to follow as a solid foundation for directing and inspecting the work of regularity building and discipline management across the entire Military. Offices and units should closely manage their troops, particularly in days off, rest hours, and independent affiliates, strictly maintain duty regulations and daily, weekly regimes, and organise patrol and guard to ensure the safety of their assigned targets. More importantly, they should comply with regulations on garrison and guard duty, closely control entries to and exits from the Headquarters - Organ of the MND, well perform ceremonial duties for international delegations, conferences, political events, and activities of the Party, State, and VPA in a safe, formal way. They should take the outcome of regularity building and discipline management as an important criterion for annual collective and individual evaluation and commendation.

Offices and units across the GS should opportunely review, adjust, and supplement plans/projects for combat readiness and fire prevention and control, prepare sufficient combat readiness materials, readily deal with situations, and guarantee the absolute safety of the Headquarters - Organ of the MND and independent affiliates. They should closely cooperate with local offices, units, party committees, authorities, and population in their stationed areas in building safe units and areas.

Fourth, further applying information technology and digital transformation to meet the task requirements of a strategic staff organ in the new situation. This is a breakthrough measure aimed at building an “adept, compact, strong” GS on par with its missions. Hence, party committees and commands of offices and units should continue grasping and realising resolutions, directives, and plans by the Party, State, CMC, and MND on breakthroughs in science - technology development, innovation, and digital transformation. Grounded on those documents, it is essential to design and quickly execute digital transformation plans within offices and units of the GS in a scientific, close fashion. Besides, “digital literacy” movement should be carried out deeply and widely to equip all cadres and soldiers with digital knowledge and skills.

Offices and units across the GS should concentrate their investments on digital infrastructures for the process of innovation and digital transformation. They should effectively employ pieces of software for management, command, and operation, enhance inspection work, and provide guidance on applying information technology in sending and receiving documents, with the aim of “organising a smooth, secret, rapid, timely, accurate command system”. They should provide technical support for information technology equipment, opportunely settle cyber incidents, ensure data and information security, and keep military secrets.

Fifth, enhancing the effectiveness of coordination with central offices, localities, and other strategic staff bodies of the MND, creating synergy, and raising the quality of directing military - defence work, the building of the VPA, the Militia and Self-Defence Force, all-people national defence, and postures of all-people national defence, people’s security, and people’s hearts and minds, as well as the work of international integration and defence diplomacy in the new era. Due regard should be paid to well implementing policies for the VPA and military families. Last but not least, the Project on attracting and utilising talents and Criteria for “Modern People’s Army in the new situation” under Decision 678/QĐ-BQP, dated 21 February 2024, by Minister of National Defence should be effectively realised.

Bringing into play their significant achievements in the past 80 years, cadres, employees, and soldiers of the GS will remain unity and proactively overcome all difficulties to obtain more feats of arms and bolster the glorious tradition of “loyalty, ingenuity, dedication, creativity, unity, coordination, determination to fight, determination to win” in the new situation.

Sr. Lt. Gen. PHUNG SI TAN

Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the VPA